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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
BRYAN O. RASMUSSEN, : Case No. 950521-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 provides: 
76-3-203.1. Offenses committed by three or more persons 
— Enhanced penalties. 
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in 
Subsection (4) in concert with two or more persons 
is subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense 
as provided below. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used 
in this section means the defendant and two or more 
other persons would be criminally liable for the 
offense as parties under Section 76-2-202. 
(2) (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if 
an indictment is returned, shall cause to be 
subscribed upon the complaint in misdemeanor cases 
or the information or indictment in felony cases 
notice that the defendant is subject to the 
enhanced penalties provided under this section. 
The notice shall be in a clause separate from and 
in addition to the substantive offense charged. 
(b) If the subscription is not included 
initially, the court may subsequently allow the 
prosecutor to amend the charging document to 
include the subscription if the court finds the 
charging documents, including any statement of 
probable cause, provide notice to the defendant of 
the allegation he committed the offense in concert 
with two or more persons, or if the court finds the 
defendant has not otherwise been substantially 
prejudiced by the omission. 
(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed 
under this section are: 
(a) If the offense is a class B misdemeanor, the 
convicted person shall serve a minimum term of 90 
consecutive days in a jail or other secure 
correctional facility. 
(b) If the offense is a class A misdemeanor, the 
convicted person shall serve a minimum term of 180 
consecutive days in a jail or other secure 
correctional facility. 
(c) If the offense is a third degree felony, the 
convicted person shall be sentenced to an enhanced 
minimum term of three years in prison. 
(d) If the offense is a second degree felony, the 
convicted person shall be sentenced to an enhanced 
minimum term of six years in prison. 
(e) If the offense is a first degree felony, the 
convicted person shall be sentenced to an enhanced 
minimum term of nine years in prison. 
(f) If the offense is a capital offense for which 
a life sentence is imposed, the convicted person 
shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 2 0 years in 
prison. 
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are: 
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 
37, 3 7a, 3 7b, or 3 7c, regarding drug-related 
offenses; 
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, 
Chapter 5, Part 1; 
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, 
Chapter 5, Part 2; 
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 
76, Chapter 5, Part 3; 
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, 
Chapter 5, Part 4; 
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in 
Section 76-5a-3; 
(g) any property destruction offense under Title 
76, Chapter 6, Part 1; 
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related 
offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 2; 
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 
76, Chapter 6, Part 3; 
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76, 
Chapter 6, Part 4; 
(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, 
Part 5, except Sections 76-6-503, 76-6-504, 
76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510, 
76-6-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 76-6-516, 
76-6-517, 76-6-518, and 76-6-520; 
(1) any offense of obstructing government 
operations under Part 3, Title 76, Chapter 8, 
except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 
76-8-307, 76-8-308, and 76-8-312; 
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation 
of Section 76-8-508; 
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal 
proceeding as defined in Section 76-8-509; 
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Part 3; 
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(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 
10, Part 5; 
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and 
performances offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Part 12; 
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title 
76, Chapter 10, Part 13; 
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 
15, Bus Passenger Safety Act; 
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 
16, Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act; 
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 
76-10-1801; 
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 
19, Money Laundering and Currency Transaction 
Reporting Act; and 
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in 
Section 76-10-2002. 
(5) (a) This section does not create any separate 
offense but provides an enhanced penalty for the 
primary offense. 
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced 
penalties under this section that the persons with 
whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert 
are not identified, apprehended, charged, or 
convicted, or that any of those persons are charged 
with or convicted of a different or lesser offense. 
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury 
shall decide whether to impose the enhanced penalty 
under this section. The imposition of the penalty 
is contingent upon a finding by the sentencing 
judge that this section is applicable. In 
conjunction With sentencing the court shall enter 
written findings of fact concerning the 
applicability of this section. 
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or execution 
of the sentence required under this section if the court: 
(a) finds that the interests of justice would be 
best served; and 
(b) states the specific circumstances justifying 
the disposition on the record and in writing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995) provides: 
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct 
commission of offense or for conduct of another. 
Every person, acting with the mental state 
required for the commission of an offense who directly 
commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to 
engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be 
criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or other infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in 
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the 
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be 
a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation. 
The fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides: 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of las; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws. 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
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No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution 
provides: 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of 
the county or district in which the offense is alleged 
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees 
to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, 
nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to 
a preliminary examination, the function of that 
examination is limited to determining whether probable 
cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. 
Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of 
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule 
in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding 
with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate 
discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution 
provides: 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — 
Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted 
by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after 
examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the 
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examination be waived by the accused with the consent 
of the State, or by indictment, with or without such 
examination and commitment. The formation of the grand 
jury and the powers and duties thereof shall be as 
prescribed by the Legislature. 
Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution 
provides: 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO 
SUPPORT IMPOSITION OF THE GANG ENHANCEMENT 
HERE. 
(Responding to State's brief at Statement of Facts 
at p. 5; Point I.B. (pp. 11-13); Point I.D. 
at p. 16; Point III.B. at p. 27) 
A. MR. RASMUSSEN'S ADMISSION THAT HE ACTED 
"AS A PARTY TO THE OFFENSE" IS NOT AN 
ADMISSION THAT HE ACTED "IN CONCERT WITH 
TWO OR MORE PERSONS." 
The State asserts that "[w]hen he pleaded guilty, 
Rasmussen admitted that he acted 'as a party to' the offenses (R. 
43-45, 94-96), thereby admitting the factual predicate for the 
section 76-3-203.1 'in concert' sentence enhancement." Br. 
Appellee at 5. Mr. Rasmussen did in fact admit that he acted "as 
a party to" the offenses. However, this language merely tracks 
the usual formulation of charging informations. E.g. State v. 
Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 994 (Utah 1993) ("Ricky Brad Abeyta, a 
party to the offense . . . " ) ; State v. Triptow, 770 P.2d 146, 153 
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(Utah 1989) ("GARY CHARLES TRIP^ P* • t \ ••• ffense 
. . " ) ; State v. Jamison, 7 • *) 
("James Jamison, a part\ >> \ {n: ^ ttens opies 01 k. 
<• ~ •* •' • attached as Addendum A. Nowhere is there any 
adinissic:: ,."-: Rasmussen committed the crimes "in concert 
with two cr more persons." 
r dUiuiLced Liie 
underlying offenses :.. ,..= •. i"j. .L rima .*:,•«. ,, ,. ...^  p^ntences and 
possible enhancement.;-; woi;.id be- applicable." :r Rasmussen 
• 1 
the underlying offenses.. Se^ .r ion .'n-.i <:w • .-:..-;:- . ;. ;..i.g 
Kv r h--* sentenfT'-i itHo^ ina! rhe defendant, committed 1 ::e crime 
. - ' - • ' • : :' • • ' : - • • w - " -'O 
evidence from wise:: : ri-r t rial c-urt coi;:d r *=asonabl . !;;ake that 
finding. 
pleas to only thv- underlying offenses also /oust, i t: ute an 
ni^^sir -tv i Me O snq enhancement is applicable contradicts its 
concert" activity ;.y a separate element of a newly defined 
aggravated crimo .v; 1 snoujd be proven at trd al v * .: ! ; rhe 
a t t f: : : • ; = ! . _ " . . ./-1;- ;'; ». J1 <.:i < ^ : • j 1 1C ] I I ill] T i g 1 1 l£i 
unanimous iur\ deterrninatior ••-. proof beyond a reasonable ooubt.. 
Br. Appellant, Poin. ;
 vpp. 11- 23). The State has steadfastly 
JIt ,s, o: couise, permissible foi a defendant to adnii t the 
factual predicate f-. • any enhancement, but thi s did not occur in 
the sase ^t b?,-
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opposed this contention. Memorandum Supporting the 
Constitutionality of Gang Enhancement Statute, R. 29-38 at 34 
("Sentencing under U.C.A. § 76-3-203.1 includes the determination 
that the defendant committed the criminal act in concert with two 
or more persons."). Mr. Rasmussen's pleas to the underlying 
offenses alone can only constitute an admission of the in concert 
activity if in concert activity is an element. If, as the State 
has argued, it is merely a sentencing consideration, then the 
plea to the underlying offense, by itself, cannot be an admission 
that the sentencing enhancement is applicable. 
The State cannot have it both ways. If the in concert 
activity is a necessary element of a new offense, Mr. Rasmussen's 
motion should have been granted and he prevails here. If not, 
then his pleas to only the underlying offenses are insufficient 
to support application of the enhanced sentence, and the 
enhancements must be vacated. 
B. TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT CONCEDE THAT THE 
GANG ENHANCEMENT WAS PROPERLY 
APPLICABLE. 
The State further asserts that Mr. Rasmussen "agreed" 
that the enhancement was applicable, citing to R. 105. Br. 
Appellee at 11. The page referenced by the State concerned the 
degree of the enhancement, if any, that was applicable in light 
of the fact that the theft charges, which were originally 2nd 
degree felonies, were reduced to 3rd degree felonies as a result 
of the legislature's amendment of the offense level 
classifications in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 1995) 
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(effective May 3 , 1 ^ *'-*) 9^f: * .': motion and stipulation to 
reduce c a t e g o i y ::> f 
Defense c *-r^l -si'- u- \ agree that any enhancement 
i ----d. ilie - ' - •- i • ^ eement does not indicate that any 
tjuci* darruo.^. •:. --.is part . : . • :>argain. Absent any such 
agreement as p.i?" •'** * n- p; ea bargain, defense counse] wou] d 
; • r . a n cj z e a i o u s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by 
assert, m u cuai i . i* * . . *-i. ;. o.^ .. i u receive a harsher sentence. 
State v. Holland, 2fil Utah Adv. Rep - ,t ; '9'-). 
C. THE GANG ENHA:^MJi:\i i i-.-- A .:J A^PijiED IN 
A PERFUNCTORY MANNER, WITH NO EVIDENCE 
TO SUPPORT ITS APPLICATION, 
Th^ State asserts that " [b]ecause Rasmussen never 
s u b i i: i :i 11 e d - ; t" i s s u e a n d t h e :i n t e n t o f 1 :i :ii s c o -
perpetrators t o any adve r s a r i a 1 t e s t i rig, he c anno t c omp 1 a in that 
the issue wou] d have been perfunctori] y decided, or too 
c o nip ] i c a t e d £ <:: i !:  1 I e 11 :i a ] c o i 11 1: t: : ci e c :i d e , :i  i i 1: :i :i s :: a s e . '' B r. 
Appellee at 11-12. This proposition rests on the incorrect 
not d on that Mr Rasmussen either admitted he acted :i n concert, or 
st:i pi i] a t e d t h a t t l le ei ll lai lcemei it cou] d be app] :i ed t : h :ii in 
contrary, no such admissions or stipulations are contained ! -_he 
record. 
1 1 ] : R a s ii:n I s s e i I app e a r e d a t s e n t e n c :i i i g , r e p r e s e 
counsel, and the matter of hi s sentence was subjected to 
adversarial testing. See Angus' < *• : rt -r ' ;- Transc rot of 
'•'•--•, -;-.-..•. . -= ' ; , I I -OJSO 
State put on no evidence concerning any codefendants or uncharged 
other actors, their actions, or their mental states. R. 109. 
The trial court's findings fail to identify any such other 
actors, what their involvement was, or the nature of their 
criminal mens rea. Based on the dearth of evidence before the 
trial court, no such findings could be made. 
The sum total of what was before the judge concerning 
in concert activity consists of the bare allegations of the 
information, R. 7-11. The information, sworn to by Det. J. W. 
Prior, asserts: 
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Agent Jeff 
Sarnacki will testify that on December 17, 1994, he 
interviewed defendant Cheeney. After being informed of 
his constitutional rights and freely agreeing to speak 
without an attorney present, defendant Cheeney admitted 
to all of the above conduct and that defendant 
Rasmussen had been involved with him. Defendant 
Cheeney also admitted that defendant Hoffman was 
involved in all but the Sundance Institute burglary and 
theft. 
R. 11. Criminal informations are not evidence. If they were, 
there would be little need for preliminary hearings: the 
information could be used to establish by a preponderance all of 
the allegations. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1228 (Utah 
1995) (probable cause standard is lower than preponderance 
standard). 
Additionally, the information suffers from multiple 
hearsay problems. Det. Prior is reporting concerning information 
relayed to him by unknown means concerning statements allegedly 
made by co-defendant Cheeney to ATF agent Sarnacki. This 
information is at best triple hearsay, and as a matter of due 
process is insufficiently reliable to be relied on at sentencing. 
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State v. Johnson 8r~- P 2d c^ --; .r:?J- . —- ^ i - -hough 
hearsay ev; . . .e^ ..•--•- . :• •---, .g, 
double hearsay is sc inherent, i.y unreliable -cKi presents sue- a 
1 robajjj.-L.LLy LUX xnaccuiacy LliaL it cannot stand alone as the 
basis for sentencing »M Bruton probleins aire likewise palpaible: 
the i nf ormatier: ieli.es entirely or. the confession of a co-
cv----ei" i -^' ;±J£kl^ i-- 1 •-i.iL.ea States, 3^1 U.&. 123, 125, 88 S . Ct. 
162-.
 ; . - 6 ^ . . 20 ]• E d . 2 d - r ; ' - •''' -:: '• ".'•' :) ' a d m i s s i o n o f co-
d e f e n d a n - ' s c o n f e s s : ! c: a t iednt- r ;- i a I \ - o l . a i e d , s i x t h amendment. 
F u l i v iVirirshai it-.-.i; ;. ;..rc ,. i ;-i i n s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o 
s u p p o r t - i m p o s i t i o n e : t h e q a n c -enhancements : i e r e . Even t h o u g h 
( : ... • t -. -• - • •=-. : lance I i i s t J t u t e 
c o u n t s o r S e p t e m b e r c t ; ^ : , , ; h i s was more , iuc -\ »ncnr n a i t . . - j r Mr 
R a s m u s s e n ' s s e n t e n c e was . imposed . S e e S t a t e m e n t : D e f e n d a n t , 
( . - . . . ' • • ^ r i < 
C'ase Nc. -;SG"-"2• • - = 'A. - a t t a c h e d is Addendum, i- -;vf -. . : I ,>e c c c r i 
c o u c i somehow r a k e n u d i r i a ! n e t i c^ <-:;- f u t u r - e v e n t s . ' - : he S t a t e 
wou] d , s td 1 ] 1: •€: one a c t o r s h o i t : f showd n g - • i 
t w o o r more p e r s o n s ,,r i i a r g e . A p p r o p r i a t e i \ . v.o g a n g 
e n h a n c e m e n t was a p p l i e d i . *."i Rasmussen or :- S u n d a n c e 
1. i i' : t ]:: ] . , :he 
three remaining cuai-'.s.. :-• w: r Mi: Rasmussen d:a rece:vt ^aiig 
enhancements. 
2 T h i s p r e m : s e :i s , of c< :)i n t : e n t 21 y a] ::»SIL o : d 
The gang enhancement in this case was applied in a most 
perfunctory manner, based on nothing more than the bare 
allegations of the charging information. Due process has been 
violated. The gang enhancements imposed must be vacated. 
POINT II. UNDER McMILLAN. THE GANG ENHANCEMENT 
EXCEEDS THE FEDERAL DUE PROCESS LIMITATIONS 
OF OFFENSE DEFINITION AS THE TAIL (THE GANG 
ENHANCEMENT) IS WAGGING THE DOG (THE 
UNDERLYING OFFENSE). 
(Responding to State's Brief at Point I.D. (pp. 
15-17) 
Under McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 
2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986), the legislature's designation of "in 
concert" activity as a sentencing consideration rather than a 
substantive element violates due process. As explained earlier, 
the State's contention that Mr. Rasmussen never "demanded a 
factfinding procedure of any nature, by jury or otherwise," Br. 
Appellee at 16, is not well taken. First, Mr. Rasmussen 
requested that the trial court hold that the issue of "in 
concert" activity should be decided by a jury at trial. R. 25-6. 
Mr. Rasmussen did not waive sentencing; the State was required to 
establish a factual predicate for the application of the gang 
enhancement at the sentencing hearing. Having failed to do so, 
the enhancement is not applicable. 
The State's contention that Mr. Rasmussen cites no 
authority, Br. Appellee at 16, is frivolous. McMillan is cited 
repeatedly, Br. Appellant at 13-15, 18, 19, and mandates that the 
statutory scheme here be held unconstitutional. 
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The State ; s recogni^ly n •" ha • " ; <.*.; ^ nteno J no r.ou rts 
traditionally ^on-sider numerous I^.-L., ;,- :.^L:- -.. .tuting 
the predicate of fens-.-," :•.' Appellee at. 1 6, does .-•.;= bring the 
:-••--*-.-•- • • ;-• He m e recu_ui CJL Ldiiy waca;r ; dogs. 
Section. 7*v -'.:• • v. t •.-  . 'i oo^ir^s more than mere"W f :;;.. : one or two 
ancillary Eact:-:- • *-guir^s 1 hro -w . ;•  r-u • additional actors 
c • i O - i r - -- - :: aDie mental 
state. w.-. -.-Lire a^Koiiunai c ,.;.- -at ...,:•.. jr A a "i ^  
State v. POWP-> -" i <: .'(^:- (Ariz, 1 ;- • -. ury 
Final] yo o- - Rasmussen Lakes exceptio; ...oe Stave's 
characterization of ;:i^ tail waaoitig arqurne^ r as on'iy requiring 
1 c«i;r-;.-,,o • 
While the tai "! • wagging metaphor usee •••  ; he oiipieme Courr :s 
admit tedl v imprecise dogs •-n qeneral ar^ e considerablv lara^r 
1 .,... :;• O . - .< S 
clear: one or two ancillary tacts may be appropriate tor 
considerate rvn - ?: : \ s- -h*r- .^ ni.ePv-.i rig stage, :•• • !* -nore need be 
here, multiple additional entire erirnir-a :. -offenses .-vast oe shov;::. 
3The State's content! on that two thirds of the necessary facts 
were shown here is not well taken. While Mr. Rasmussen did plead 
guilty to counts 111 through V, on which he was sentenced to the 
gang enhancement, co-defendant Cheeney only pled to counts 1 and 
II, the Sundance Institute burglary and theft, for which Mr. 
Rasmussen was not sentenced to a gang enhancement. See Addendum B. 
Even if Mr. Cheeney had pled to counts III through V, the 
State would be one third short. While "two 01 it of three ain't 
bad," due process requ ires consi derab] y more. 
] 3 
we have a dog that is wagged by its tail. The gang enhancement 
should be declared unconstitutional under McMillan. 
This Court quite recently held that whether a drug 
offense was committed within 1000 feet of a park is an additional 
element that must be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Powasnik, No. 960116-CA, slip op. at 3 (Utah 
App. May 31, 1996) (M[T]oday we explicitly announce the penalty 
enhancement statute adds an extra element to those drug offenses 
that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to the same trier 
of fact who decides the predicate offense.11). Even in the 
context of determining a mere distance from a tangible place, 
this Court has decided that that single fact should be presented 
to the jury. Here, with the multitude of facts inherent in the 
two entire additional criminal offenses required by the gang 
enhancement, jury determination is only more necessary and 
appropriate. 
POINT III. MR. RASMUSSENfS INDEPENDENT STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT CONCERNING 
LIMITATIONS ON OFFENSE DEFINITION IS 
MERITORIOUS AND PRESERVED FOR APPELLATE 
REVIEW. 
(Responding to State's Brief at Point I.E. (pp. 
17-19) 
Mr. Rasmussen argued independent state constitutional 
analysis in the trial court. The trial court was cited to State 
v. Wedge, 652 P.2d 773, 777 (Or. 1982). R. 26. Wedge was 
decided exclusively under article I, section 11 of the Oregon 
Constitution. Wedge, 652 P.2d at 775. Mr. Rasmussen's reliance 
14 
on this pit ai .- < nnp! iMitional analysis, and the trial court's 
i I.lie irier i l;:s , presei \/e I. hit* issue for 
appellate review. 
On the mer; *•:•'. *" tr 5"i-v^'s -f--'< • - «: P1 ir ?'• ' cr 
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 8 
(1975) and Patterson v, New York, 4j, •": . •:.-.:->, 53 
I "^  "• ' m Liie oLlense deimiLiun ibbue m this case 
tails. Mullaney and Patterson both concern the appropriate 
jlriit..o on offense definition what must be considered an 
e • --T- •• • the State beyond a reasonab] e doi ibt, and 
what may appropriately be carv ed out from tl le definition of the 
defense and dealt with in a different fashion. The conflict 
between Mullane v and Patterson make an :i ndepei ident state 
constitutional analysis appropriate. This Court shoul d hold that 
the gang enhancement defines new offenses, subject to the panoply 
c ' p i o t e c t i o i I s a c c o i: d e d c i: :ii m :i i i a ] d e f e n d a n t s . 
POINT IV. MR. RASMUSSEN PRESERVED HIS UNIFORM 
OPERATION OF LAWS ARGUMENT. 
( R e s p o n d : r-...\ r o r. Y\<- ; : t a r «--' <? U-r-i^f --r p . ' l ° ) 
]y 
c o u r t . R . y.:, . . r., - .. w-xrr i.-:: p r e s e r v e d 1 or ippea.j. . The Si. it e 
o f f e r s n m e r i t s argument. x>v^5SiLion : o • ;i L s I s s u e . As s e t 
f • •• - - - - p . . . . , . I - - - - : 
enhancement is ;^;const.:i tutional under art' i c . ; -••••.t;j:i j* 
because : •r,e:: '.<-•• ---ive a reasonable tendency L~ lurthei the 
obj 
POINT V. THE GANG ENHANCEMENT IS NOT TRUE TO ITS 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT. 
(Responding to State's Brief at Point II (pp. 19-
23) 
A. RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ARE MERE 
TOOLS FOR DISCOVERING LEGISLATIVE 
INTENT, AND MAY NOT BE USED TO SUBVERT 
THE LEGISLATURE'S TRUE INTENT WHEN THAT 
INTENT IS UNEQUIVOCALLY EXPRESSED IN THE 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY. 
The State correctly notes that in the ordinary case, 
appellate courts should not look beyond the plain language of a 
statute when that language is unambiguous. Br. Appellee at 22. 
However, the case at bar is not the ordinary case. The 
legislative history unmistakably reveals that the legislature 
deliberately wrote the statute in broad terms to avoid perceived 
(but unrealized) constitutional defects. The undisputed 
underlying intent, however, was that the statute only apply to 
members of criminal street gangs. The rules of statutory 
construction are mere tools to ascertain legislative intent, and 
cannot be applied to contravene the true intent of the 
legislature that the gang enhancement apply only to criminal 
street gang members: 
The fundamental consideration which transcends all 
others in regard to the interpretation and application 
of a statute is: What was the intent of the 
legislature?" All other rules of statutory 
construction are subordinate to it and are helpful only 
insofar as they assist in attaining that objective. In 
determining that intent the statute should be 
considered in the light of the purpose it was designed 
to serve and so applied as to carry out that purpose if 
that can be done consistent with its language. 
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Johnson v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 P.2d 831, 832 (Utah 1966) 
(footnote cites om:i tted) . 
[H]elpful as rules of construction often are, they are 
useful guides, but poor masters; and they should not be 
regarded as having any such rigidity as to have the 
force of law,, or distort an otherwise natural meaning 
or intent." Their only legitimate function is to 
assist in ascertaining the true intent and purpose of 
the statute. [] 
Salt LaK^ ^ , ~„: z_ -^Ko --JU.: :. • • • ' /3o , 741 (Utah 1 9 7 7 ) 
( f o o t n o t e c i t e - * : r \ o * e - v A c c o r d Cul lum v . Farmers I n s . 
E x c h a n g e , 8 - " r r.i ^22. v,'^ o; ioai 1'-•--• -o„, :. o- p r i t n a n 
t h e i n t e n t o t ;.;;-• i . ^ q i s l a t u r e , iii-j >-,.v,-3 -..-: ^?ia; u i u i \ 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n e x i ^ ^ : .n iv t o a s s i s t . ' •)••• a o t e r m i n a t ic i i . 
i-\L"Iit" i -i t- ex :.i -, '•->G, i. -•• • - . . ... - cA 11 O S L i O O j ; , 
Court, - s r o o v . a r v r e s p o n s i b i l i t y : o o n s t r u i n a i .eci HJ a t . io r . . .-• t o 
r i i v e e f f e c t ; t .-• r-u- - :-^pt r:f f h p l e q i s ] at" u •••.-. ° ) ; Young v . B a r n e y , 
a p p l i c a t i o n oi -J » *.; . O o.r a .sJ a L «'...•/ t ; .a a i v - i : s • -. .;,/ .1*. n ;.he 
p r i m a r y o b j e c t - v - e it> t o d i s c o v e r t h e I L I C I I . a n d p u r p o s e LOL w h i c h 
- r. • h i s c a s e , t h e l i t e r a l l a n g u a g e of § 7 G - 3 - 2 0 3 ": m u s t 
n i v e w^y '• - '-''•' o e n : i J Y O c a . ] ] v e x p r e s s e d I L L U ^ wi L;ie 
In addition, 
one of the fundamental rules i.,-i ->, « K. U , ^ : y 
construction is that the statute should be 
looked at as a whole and ir ; igh- M the 
general purpose it was intended to serve; 
and should be so interpreted and applied as 
to accomplish that objective. In order to 
give the statute the implem.en.tei.tion which 
will fulfill its purpose, reason and 
intention sometimes prevail over technically 
applied literalness. 
Andrus v. Allred, 17 Utah 2d 106, 109, 404 P.2d 972, 
974 (1965) . 
State v. Jones, 735 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah App. 1987). 
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly stated 
that, in spite of a statute's plain language, statutes must be 
construed in accord with the legislature's intent. In Church of 
the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459, 12 S.Ct. 
511, 512, 36 L.Ed. 226 (1892), the Court held: 
It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the 
letter of the statute and yet not; within the statute, 
because not within its spirit nor within the intention 
of its makers. This has been often asserted, and the 
Reports are full of cases illustrating its application. 
This is not the substitution of the will of the judge 
for that of the legislator; for frequently words of 
general meaning are used in a statute, words broad 
enough to include an act in question, and yet a 
consideration of the whole legislation, or of the 
circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the 
absurd results which follow from giving such broad 
meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe 
that the legislator intended to include the particular 
act. 
The Supreme Court was interpreting a statute which read: 
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person, company, 
partnership, or corporation, in any manner whatsoever, 
to prepay the transportation, or in any way assist or 
encourage the importation or migration, of any alien or 
aliens, any foreigner or foreigners, into the United 
States, its territories, or the District of Columbia, 
under contract or agreement, parol or special, express 
or implied, made previous to the importation or 
migration of such alien or aliens, foreigner or 
foreigners, to perform labor or service of any kind in 
the United States, its territories, or the District of 
Columbia. 
Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 458. Despite the plain 
language of the statute, the Court held it inapplicable to the 
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church, which had arranged for the transport of an Englishman to 
serve as rector and pastor at the church in New York City. The 
legislative history made clear that "the intent of congress was 
simply to stay the influx of this cheap, unskilled labor." 
Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 465. 
Numerous other Supreme Court cases are in accord. 
E.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 
109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989): 
The plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, 
except in the "rare cases [in which] the literal 
application of a statute will produce a result 
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its 
drafters." Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 
U.S. 564, 571, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 3250, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 
(1982). In such cases, the intention of the drafters, 
rather than the strict language, controls. Ibid. 
Id. at 242, 109 S.Ct. at 1031; National R. R. Passenger Corp. v. 
National Ass'n of R. R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458, 94 S.Ct. 
690, 693, 38 L.Ed.2d 646 (1974) ("But even the most basic general 
principles of statutory construction must yield to clear contrary 
evidence of legislative intent."); United States v. American 
Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 1064, 84 L.Ed. 1345 
(1940) : 
Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning did 
not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable 
one 'plainly at variance with the policy of the 
legislation as a whole' [] this Court has followed that 
purpose, rather than the literal words." When aid to 
construction of the meaning of words, as used in the 
statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule 
of law' which forbids its"use," however clear the 
words may appear on 'superficial examination.'n 
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Id. at 543-4, 60 S.Ct. at 1064 (footnote cites omitted); Harrison 
v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 63 S.Ct. 361, 87 L.Ed. 407 
(1943) : 
But words are inexact tools at best and for that reason 
there is wisely no rule of law forbidding resort to 
explanatory legislative history no matter how "clear 
the words may appear on 'superficial examination.111 
Id. at 479, 63 S.Ct. at 363; see also Burlington Northern R. Co. 
v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 107 S.Ct. 1855, 95 L.Ed.2d 
404 (1987): 
Legislative history can be a legitimate guide to a 
statutory purpose obscured by ambiguity, but "[i]n the 
absence of a 'clearly expressed legislative intention 
to the contrary,' the language of the statute itself 
'must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.' " United 
States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 606, 106 S.Ct. 3116, 
3121, 92 L.Ed.2d 483 (1986) (quoting Consumer Product 
Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 
100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980)). Unless 
exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise, "[w]hen we 
find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial 
inquiry is complete." Rubin v. United States, 44 9 U.S. 
424, 430, 101 S.Ct. 698, 701, 66 L.Ed.2d 633 (1981). 
Id. at 461, 107 S.Ct. at 1860; United States v. Universal C.I.T. 
Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 73 S.Ct. 227, 230, 97 L.Ed. 260 
(1952) ("Instead of balancing the various generalized axioms of 
experience in construing legislation, regard for the specific 
history of the legislative process that culminated in the Act now 
before us affords more solid ground for giving it appropriate 
meaning."); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance, 452 U.S. 155, 158 
n.3, 101 S.Ct. 2239, 2241 n.3, 68 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981) ("Absent a 
clear indication of legislative intent to the contrary, the 
statutory language controls its construction."). 
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In pursuit of brevity, courts have frequently 
abbreviated discussion of statutory construction down to a simple 
statement such as "unambiguous language controls" or "the 
specific controls the general," without discussing that the 
purpose of all statutory construction is to determine legislative 
intent. While these quick and easy catch phrases serve well in a 
majority of cases, and result in an interpretation in accord with 
legislative intent, in those cases (as here) where legislative 
intent is to the contrary the statutes must be construed so as to 
give effect to that legislative intent. 
B. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS WITH THE 
GANG ENHANCEMENT WERE CREATED BY THE 
LEGISLATURE, NOT BY APPELLANT'S READING 
OF THE STATUTE IN CONFORMITY WITH THE 
LEGISLATURE'S UNEQUIVOCALLY EXPRESSED 
INTENT. 
The State correctly notes that statutes should be 
construed, where reasonable, to avoid constitutional problems. 
Br. Appellee at 23. However, the constitutional problems at 
issue here inhere in the statute, rather than any interpretive 
gloss applied to it. As cases cited in the preceding section 
demonstrate, this Court's primary responsibility in construing 
the gang enhancement is to give effect to the intent of the 
legislature. Construing § 76-3-203.1 as applying to non-
gangmembers, as the State suggests, requires that this Court 
construe the statute to mean something other than what the 
legislature intended. Such a result would be an abdication of 
this Court's duty and responsibility to give effect to the intent 
21 
of the legislature. Such a corruption of both the judicial and 
legislative processes should be avoided. 
• * * 
Mr. Rasmussen relies on his opening brief in response 
to those portions of the State's brief not expressly addressed 
here. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Rasmussen respectfully 
requests that this Court strike the gang enhancement statute as 
being unconstitutional. At minimum, the enhancement applied to 
his sentence must be vacated as not being supported by the 
evidence adduced in the trial court. A 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this f day of June, 1996. 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
JUDITH A. JENSEN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
Facts admitted as part of guilty pleas (R. 43-45, 94-96) 
transaction card offenses; possession of forged writing or device 
for writing; and involving one or more of the folloiwng persons: 
Justine Woodworth, Christopher Cheeney, Jason Kone, Michael Chad 
Hoffman, Brandon Bell, Brandon Winters, Amy Trivitt, Trinidad Pena-
Quarles, Corene Dillard, "Cat." Defendant agrees to pay restituion 
on all dismissed or matters which have not been filed.^ 
I have received a copy of the information against me, I have 
read it, and I understand the nature and elements of the offense (s) 
for which I am pleading (guilty). 
The elements of the crime (s) of which I am charged are as 
follows: Count I: On or about 9/30/94, in Salt Lake County, Utah 
Defendant, as a party to the offense, entered or remained 
unlawfully in the building of Sundance Institute with intent to 
commit theft; Count II: On or about 9/30/94, in Salt Lake County, 
Utah, Defendant, as a party to the offense, did obtain or exercise 
unauthorized control over the property of Sundance Institute with 
a purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and the value of said 
property exceeded $1,000; Count III (Burcrlarv) : On or about 
11/7/94, Defendant, as a party to the offense, in Salt Lake County, 
Utah, did enter or remain unlawfully in the building of Sear Brown 
Group with the intent to commit a theft; Count IV (Theft): On or 
about 11/7/94, in Salt Lake County, Utah , Defendant as a party to 
the offense, did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the 
property of the Sear Brown Group with the intent to deprive the 
owner thereof, and the value of said property exceeded $1,000; 
Count V Burglary: On or about 11/7/94, in Salt Lake County, Utah, 
0 0 0 0 4? 
Defendant, as a party to the offense, did enter or remain 
unlawfully in the building of Gump and Ayers Real Estate with the 
intent to commit a theft. 
My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am 
criminally liable, that constitutes the elements of the crime(s) 
charged are as follows: Count I: On or about 9/30/94, at 307 West 
200 South, in Salt Lake County, Utah, Defendant, as a party to the 
offense, entered or remained unlawfully in the building of Sundance 
Institute with intent to commit a theft; Count II (Theft): On or 
about 9/30/94, at 307 West 200 South, in Salt Lake County, Utah, 
Defendant, as a party to the offense, obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over the property of Sundance Institute, to 
wit, a money bag and money box containing approximately $2,4000, 
several 2-way radios and other items of personal property; with the 
intent to deprive the owner thereof; Count III (Burglary): On or 
about 11/7/94, in Salt Lake County, Utah, Defendant, as a party to 
the offense, at 2749 East Parley's Way, did enter or remain 
unlawfully in the building of Sear Brown Group with the intent to 
commit a theft; Count IV (Theft) : On or about 11/7/94, in Salt Lake 
County, Utah, Defendant, as a party to the offense, at 274 9 East 
Parley's Way, did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the 
property of the Sear Brown Group, to wit, a computer system, a 
lazer plotter, and a lap top computer, with the intent to deprive 
the owner thereof, and the value of said property exceeded 
$1,000.00; Count V (Burglary): On or about 11/7/94, at 2749 
Parley's Way, in Salt Lake County, Utah, Defendant, as a party to 
4 
the offense, did enter or remain unlawfully in the building of Gump 
and Ayers with the intent to commit a theft. 
I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with 
knowledge and understanding of the following facts: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an 
attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be 
appointed by the court at no cost to me. I recognize that a 
condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, as 
determined by the Court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so 
appointed for me. 
2. I (have not) waived my right to counsel. 
3. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this 
statement and understand the nature and elements of the charges, my 
rights in this and other proceedings and the consequences of my 
plea of guilty. 
4. If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is 
Judith A. Jensen, and I have had an opportunity to discuss this 
statement, my rights and the consequences of my guilty plea with my 
attorney. 
5. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury. 
6. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to have them 
cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I have the right 
to compel my witness(es) by subpoena at State expense to testify in 
court in my behalf. 
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf 
5 
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own behalf if you choose, and the right to appeal in the 
event a jury finds you guilty of the charges that are 
tried, all of which rights, as well as any others contained 
on that statement that we haven't discussed you are waiving 
by the entry of a guilty plea; do you understand? 
DEFENDANT RASMUSSEN: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And knowing of those waivers, do you 
want to proceed with this plea that's outlined here today? 
DEFENDANT RASMUSSEN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And you're doing this freely and 
voluntarily? 
DEFENDANT RASMUSSEN: Yes, sir. 
13 I THE COURT: Are you prepared at this time, Mr. 
14 Rasmussen, to sign this statement? 
15 DEFENDANT RASMUSSEN: Yes. 
16 THE COURT: You may do so. 
17 J (Whereupon, the defendant signed the document.) 
18
 J THE COURT: The defendant and both counsel have 
19 J signed the statement of the defendant. 
Mr. Rasmussen, by having signed this statement, 
21 1 you are admitting as true and correct the following facts 
^nd elements involved in three separate — excuse me — in 
vthree separate burglary charges, third-degree felony 
'burglary charges, and in two separate second-degree felony 
charges of theft, that on or about the 30th of September of 
14 
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1 1994 in Salt Lake County you, a party to the offense, entered] 
2 or remained unlawfully in the building of Sundance Institute 
3 with the intent to commit a theft. That's in Count One. 
4 in Count Two, that on or about the 30th of 
5 September, 1994, in Salt Lake County, you, as a party to the 
6 offense, did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over 
7 the property of Sundance Institute with the purpose to 
8 deprive the owner of that property, and the value of that 
9 property exceeded $1,000, and Count Three, burglary, that 
10 on or about the 7th of November of 1994, you, as a party to 
11 the offense, in Salt Lake County, did enter and/or remain 
12 unlawfully in the building of Sear Brown Group with the 
13 intent to commit a theft, and as to Count Four, theft, that 
14 on or about that date, 7 November 1994, in Salt Lake County, 
15 you, as a party to the offense, did obtain or exercise 
16 unauthorized control over the property of Sear Brown Group 
17 with the intent to deprive the owners thereof, and the value 
18 of that property exceeded $1,000. Count Five, burglary, 
19 that on or about November 7, 1995, in Salt Lake County, 
20 that you, a party to the offense, did enter or remain 
21 unlawfully in the building of Gump and Ayers Real Estate with 
22 the intent to commit a theft, that the events occuring on 
23 the 30th day of September of 1994 occurred at 307 West 200 
24 South in Salt Lake County, and that the events that 
25 occurred on the date of November 7th, 1994, occurred at 
15 
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2 74 9 East Parley's Way in Salt Lake County, and that in 
each of these entrances into the building or premises of 
others you intended to commit a theft therein and indeed, 
you did commit thefts, those that are outlined in this 
statement, and those are the reasons that you are entering 
your pleas of guilty in this matter; is that right, Mr. 
Rasmussen? 
DEFENDANT RASMUSSEN: Yes, sir. 
MS. JENSEN: Your Honor, might I confer with Mr. 
Rasmussen just half a minute? 
THE COURT: Yes, you may. 
MS- JENSEN: Thank you, your Honor. We're prepared, 
THE COURT: All right. I've forgotten where I was 
now. I think I said to you, Mr. Rasmussen, that you are 
entering pleas of guilty in these five separate felony 
count charges because you indeed are guilty; is that right? 
DEFENDANT RASMUSSEN: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And that while you may disagree with 
my view and my ruling on the constitutionality of the gang 
enhancement provision and you may certainly appeal that, 
by the entry of these pleas you are going to be presumed 
guilty until such time and if the Court of Appeals or 
whomever decides to reverse me in this matter; do you 
understand that? 
DEFENDANT RASMUSSEN: Yes, your Honor. 
16 
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ADDENDUM B 
Co-Defendant Cheeney's Statement of Defendant, 
Certificate of Counsel and Order dated September 8, 1995, R. 27-
36 in case No. 950720-CA 
By. 
Third Judicial District 
SEP 8 1995 
.SALT^KECOUI 
REBECCA C. HYDE (#6409) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
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v. 
CHRISTOPHER ALEX CHEENEY, 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
AND ORDER 
Case NO.951901609FS 
951901608FS 
951901610FS 
JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
COMES NOW, Christopher Alex Cheeney, the defendant in 
this case and hereby acknowledges and certifies the following: 
I have entered a plea of guilty to the following 
crime(s): 
CRIME & STATUTORY 
PROVISION 
A. Count If" Burglary 
76-6-202 U.C.A. 
B. Count 11^ Theft 
76-6-404 U.C.A. 
DEGREE PUNISHMENT 
Min/Max and/or 
Min/Mandatory 
3 Felony 0v-5 wears prison 
and/or $5,000 fine 
2 Felony 1-15 years prison 
and/or $10,000 fine 
plus 85% surcharge 
0 0402? 
I have received a copy of the information against me, I 
have read it, and I understand the natjire^and elements of the 
offense(s) for which I am pleading^ (guilt 
The elements of the crime(si of which I am charged are 
as follows: 'Count :££: On or about 1AA25J&A-. in Salt Lake 
County, Utah, Defendant, as a party to the offense, entered or 
£>JU0Ne\CXVVUL : C ^ = > ^ " ^ o \ < _ 
remained unlawful ly in the b u i l d i n g of &am Wtflluiu BT^LC wi th 
3^/25794, intent to commit theft; Count 11^: On or about in Salt 
Lake County, Utah, Defendant, as a party to the offense, did 
. obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the property of Ssm 
\\s\ Wiulli&iL riiiiA-.s with a purpose to deprive the owner therof, and the 
value of said property exceeded $5,000. 
My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am 
criminally liable, that constitutes the elements of the crime(s) 
charged are as follows: 
On or about October 2D, 1995", I entered S fce ci- 5 »y S^"| W^i "Lggr' s » 
' Bookstore and took without permission property belonging to Sag* 
^^R-FT^S having a value exceeding $5,000. 
I am entering these plea(s) voluntarily and with knowledge 
and understanding of the following facts: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an 
attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be 
appointed by the court at no cost to me. I recognize that a 
condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, 
as determined by the Court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so 
appointed for me. 
fflM4)2$ 
2. I rhave not) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I 
have waived my^right to counsel, I have done so knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
3. If I have waived^ rry right to counsel, I have read this 
statement and und^f^tand the nature and elements of the charges, 
my rights irfchis and other proceedings and the consequences of 
my pi€a of guilty. 
4. If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is 
REBECCA C. HYDE, and I have had an opportunity to discuss this 
statement, my rights and the consequences of my guilty plea with 
my attorney. 
5. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury. 
6. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right 
to confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to have 
them cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I have the 
right to compel my witness(es) by subpoena at state expense to 
testify in court upon my behalf. 
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf 
but if I choose not to do so I can not be compelled to testify or 
give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences will be 
drawn against me if I do not testify. 
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me I 
need only plead "not guilty" and the matter will be set for 
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trial. At the trial the state of Utah will have the burden of 
proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If 
the trial is before a jury the verdict must be unanimous. 
9. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I 
were tried and convicted by a jury or by the judge that I would 
have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah 
Court of Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court and 
that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, 
those costs would be paid by the State. 
10. I know that the maximum sentence that may be imposed 
for each offense to which I plead guilty. I know that by 
pleading guilty to an offense that carries a minimum mandatory 
sentence that I will be subjecting myself to serving a minimum 
mandatory sentence for that offense. I know that the sentences 
may be consecutive and may be for a prison term, fine, or both. 
I know that in addition to any fine, an (twenty-five [25%] ) 
eighty-five [85%]) surcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated 
63-63a-4, will be imposed. I also know that I may be ordered by 
the court to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crime. 
11. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive 
periods, or the fine for additional amounts, if my plea is to 
more than one charge. I also know that if I am on probation, 
parole or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have 
been convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the 
present action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed 
upon me. 
12. I know and understand that by pleading guilty I am 
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waiving my statutory and constitutional rights set out in the 
preceding paragraphs. I also know that by entering such plea(s) 
I am admitting and do so admit that I have committed the conduct 
alleged and I am guilty of the crime(s) for which my plea(s) 
is/are entered. 
13. My plea(s) of guilty is the result of a plea bargain 
between myself and the prosecuting attorney. The promises, 
duties and provisions of this plea bargain, if any, are fully 
contained in the Plea Agreement attached to this affidavit. 
14. I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my 
plea(s) of guilty I must do so by filing a motion within thirty 
(3 0) days after entry of my plea. 
15. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a 
reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by either 
defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on 
the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as 
to what they believe that court may do are also not binding on 
the court. 
16. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind 
have been made to induce me to plead guilty, and no promises 
except, those contained herein and in the attached plea 
agreement, have been made to me. 
17. I have read this statement or I have had it read to me 
by my attorney, and I understand its provisions. I know that I 
am free to change or delete anything contained in this statement. 
I do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements 
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are correct. 
18. I am satisfied with the advise and assistance of my 
attorney. 
19. I amJfD years of age; I have attended school through 
the \ty grade and I can read and understand the English language 
or an interpreter has been provided to me. I was not under the 
influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants which would 
impair my judgment when the decision was made to enter the 
plea(s). I am not presently under the influence of any drugs, 
medication or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
20. I believe myself to be of a sound and discerning mind, 
mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the 
consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease, defect or 
impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently 
and voluntarily entering my plea. 
DATED this cT day of <jZ>~o.p v > , 
DEFENDANT 
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CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for (A(Vt \VWp\VQ C CVJIMX^X 
the defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the 
statement or that we have read it to him/her and I have discussed 
it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the 
meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. 
To the best of my knowledge and belief after an appropriate 
investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual 
synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated 
and these, along with the other representations and declarations 
made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate 
and true. / ^ / / /I 
TORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/BAR # 
t\ to £\ ft O <> 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the 
case against v\f\VK4\^ NojT VAM&~(\Jl{b/ , defendant I have reviewed 
this statement of the defendant and find that the declaration, 
including the elements of the offense of the charge(s) and the 
factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct which 
constitutes the offense are true and correct. No improper 
inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea have been 
offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in 
the statement and in the attached plea agreement or as 
supplemented on record before the court. There is reasonable 
cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction 
of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are 
entered and acceptance of the pleas would serve the public 
interest. 
ROSfeCUT/NG ^ Moi^l'tT^ARHP" 
Q ,^J^ 
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ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement 
and certification, the court finds the defendant's plea of guilty 
is freely and voluntarily made and it is so ordered that the 
defendant's plea of guilty to the charge(s) set forth in the 
statement be accepted and entered. 
DONE IN COURT this A v day of VJiy 1995 
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The following terms and conditions of this plea have been 
argued to by the defendant, defendant's counsel and the 
prosecution: 
The State agrees to recommend that the Court 
sentence the two counts to run concurrently with each other, gang 
enhancement attached. The State agrees that Defendant's plea 
shall be in the nature of a Serv plea and, therefore, conditioned 
upon the preservation of Defendant's right to appeal the 
constitutionality of the Gang Enhancement Statute. The State 
agrees to dismiss all remaining counts in the present case to 
dismiss State v. Cheenev, Case Nos. 951901608FS, 95IVOliSOSgg*, and 
951901610FS. The State agrees not to file any additional charges 
arising in Salt Lake County, Utah, during the years 1993 and 1994 
involving property crimes, including theft; theft by receiving; 
and offenses included in 76-6-408, Utah Code Ann.; robbery; 
nonresidential burglary; possession of burglary tools; forgery; 
financial transaction card offenses; possession of forged writing 
or device for writing; and involving one or more of the following 
persons: Justine Woodworth, Bryan Rasmussen, Jason Kone, Michael 
Chad Hoffman, Brandon Bell, Brandon Winters, Amy Trivitt, 
Trinidad Pena-Ouarles, Corene Dillard, "Cat." Defendant agrees 
to pay restitution on all dismisses or matters which have not 
been filed. The State agrees that this plea is based on evidence 
other than statements made by co-defendant Justine Woodword and 
the State agrees not to rely on said statements in sentencing. 
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